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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jesus

Manuel Garcia appeals from

the district court’s

judgment and order of

restitution

entered after a jury found Garcia guilty of second-degree murder, aggravated battery, an

enhancement

for using a deadly

weapon, and possession 0f methamphetamine. Garcia argues

by allowing the

the district court erred

state to

use “in

life”

that

photographs of the murder Victim,

allowing the murder Victim’s wife t0 testify about the murder Victim, overruling his counsel’s
objection to the prosecutor’s closing argument, imposing an excessive sentence, and ordering

restitution.

Statement

Of The

Jesus

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Manuel Garcia stabbed Daviel Gomez through

eight times in the upper body.

p.1665, L.12.1)

Gomez

(T12,

the heart and stabbed Luis Rosales

p.956, Ls.1-6, p.1447, L.13

died; Rosales lived.

— p.1448,

L.4, p.1664, L.19

(TL, p.933, Ls.16-18, p.1451, Ls.2-14.)

—

A jury

convicted Garcia of second-degree murder, aggravated battery, an enhancement for using a deadly

weapon, and possession of methamphetamine.

At

trial,

(R., pp.572-73.)

the jury heard the circumstances of the stabbings.

went out with a group of

methamphetamine and

friends.

his knife.

(TL, p.1007, L.25

(TL, p.1619, L.18

On

— p.1008,

— p.1620,

January 13, 2017, Garcia
L.12.)

He

brought his

L.24, p.1622, Ls.5-7.)

The group

ﬁrst stopped at Buffalo

Wild Wings. (TL, p.1619,

some of his meth.

p.1619, Ls.18-23.) After dinner, the group decided to go bar hopping in

downtown

1

(Tr.,

Boise. (T12, p.1009, L.24

— p.1010,

Ls.1-8.)

They

ate dinner,

and Garcia snorted

L.10.)

Unless otherwise indicated, citations t0 the transcript refer to the

trial transcript.

According

t0

members 0f Garcia’s group, Garcia “was

literally

ﬂexing the whole night”

and acting “rowdy,” “[W]i1d,” and “stupid.” (TL, p.552, Ls.14-18, p.582, Ls. 14-21, p.1015, Ls.1

The group

14.)

ﬁrst

went

downtown

to Fatty’s, a bar in

“seemed kind of agitated” and was “dogging people
a

mean manner.”

and
p.

1

that “if

p.13 13, L.22

(Tr.,

someone even looked

3 14, L. 1 8

at

him

meaning he was “looking at people

L.5.) Garcia said that “he

the

was looking

.

.

.

in

for a ﬁght”

to eff

them up.” (TL,

at Fatty’s left

because Garcia’s

wrong way, he was going

— p.13 1 5, L23.) Two women who met Garcia’s group

behavior and comments
L.

— p.13 14,

out,”

Garcia

(TL, p.569, Ls.15-18.)

Boise.

1-

made at least one 0fthem feel uncomfortable.

(T12, p.

1

3

1

5,

L.11

— p. 1 3 16,

1 .)

Garcia’s group next went to Hannah’s, another bar in

18.)

downtown Boise.

(Tr.,

p.569, Ls. 1 5-

Garcia “instigat[ed]” a confrontation With two strangers like he was “trying t0 get into a

ﬁght.”

(TL, p.1061, L.14

— p.1062,

between Garcia and the two

One 0f the women

L.13.)

in Garcia’s

group had to get in

When Garcia rejoined his

strangers. (TL, p. 1063, Ls.4-21.)

group he

pulled out his knife and “bragged about wanting to d0 shit” t0 the two strangers. (TL, p.554, L.10

—

p.555, L.7, p.583, Ls.8—24.)

stop and to calm

down.

Garcia’s group

behavior continued.

(Tr.,

group got in Garcia’s face and told him to

p.584, Ls.4-10.)

moved
(Tr.,

A woman in Garcia’s

t0

China Blue, a

p.1010, Ls.13-17;

third bar in

ﬂ

Tr.,

downtown

p.582, Ls.14-24.)

“concerned” and did not “want [Garcia] t0 go off on his own.”
Garcia went t0 the bathroom, his friend tagged along.

bathroom, Garcia elbow checked a stranger
Ls.3-7;

ﬂ

State’s EX. 65,

ch06

(Tr.,

(Tr.,

rowdy

Garcia’s friend

p.1015, Ls.15-24.) So

p.1017, Ls.8-15.)

Who “had done

at 3:25-3:31.)

Boise, and Garcia’s

On

nothing to [Garcia].”

the

was

when

way t0

(Tr.,

the

p.1643,

Garcia got in the stranger’s face and pushed the

stranger before Garcia’s friend stepped in “to de-escalate the situation.” (Tr., p.1021, Ls.6-14;

State’s EX. 65,

ch06

at 3:31-3:41.)

W

ﬂ

Garcia pulled out his knife. (State’s EXS. 69, 70A, 70B.)

Right before entering the restroom, Garcia ﬂipped his knife blade open. (State’s EX. 65,

ch11

10:27-10:29;

at

ﬂ

State’s EX. 76,

State’s EX. 77.)

Garcia said something t0 another stranger, Luis Rosales.
p.957, Ls.14-25.)

Rosales

left

the

79

(State’s EX.

Rosales ignored Garcia; Garcia shoved him.

bathroom and went back

Once

inside the bathroom,

at 3:50-3:54;

(State’s EX.

to his friends at the bar. (State’s EX.

79

79

ﬂ

Tr.,

at 4:00-4:07.)

at 4:07-42 13.)

Garcia and his friend came out of the bathroom shortly after Rosales and walked out t0 the

dance ﬂoor. (State’s EX. 65, ch11

at 11200-1

1

(TL, p.942, Ls. 1 9-24.) Rosales “felt like there

and Misael

Gomez

p.942, L.25

—

(“Misael”), “if they

p.943, L.7.)

He

Gomez and

stabbed

had

lower lobe of the

Rosales twice 0n the

ch15

at 2:02-2:14.)

lung and then penetrated

of the heart.”

and once

left side

in the left

if [they]

that Garcia

(TL,

knew each

had a knife

in his

Garcia went on a stabbing spree: he

chest; the knife “penetrated the chest cavity

left ventricle

said no.”

his knife in his right hand. (State’s EX. 88.)

(Tr.,

.

.

.

(T12,

on the

p.1678, Ls.12-17.)

left,

went through the

the tissue surrounding the heart and then

p.1447, L.17

Gomez in the abdomen, Which “made a hole in the

94),

by chance and they both

Rosales ten times in approximately eleven seconds.

left

Gomez

friends, Daviel

friend. (TL, p.943, Ls. 14-22, p.944, Ls.1 1-12, p.946, Ls.7—

(State’s EX. 65,

Gomez in the

penetrated the

[Garcia]

Gomez, and Misael—all unarmed and unaware

A ﬁght broke out.

stabbed

was tension,” so he asked his

knew

still

hand—approached Garcia and Garcia’s
13.)

at [Rosales’s] direction.”

Rosales “decided t0 g0 up to [Garcia] and see

other.” (TL, p.943, Ls.8-13.) Garcia

Rosales,

Garcia kept “looking

:22.)

— p.1448,

stomach.” (TL,

p.

L.4.) Garcia also stabbed

1448, Ls.1 1-19.)

He

stabbed

of his torso (State’s EX. 93), three times in the stomach (State’s EX.

elbow

(State’s EX. 93).

A bouncer who
was deﬁnitely

like

did not see the start 0f the altercation but tried to break

an aggressor.” (TL, p.906, L.13 — p.907, L.1.)

aggressor and said Garcia “was deﬁnitely
p.910, L.22

was

— p.91 1,

really trying t0

L.5.)

.

.

identiﬁed Garcia as the

A woman standing next to the ﬁght said, “at ﬁrst

Ls.3-10.)

[Gomez] and he was —

I

up said “there

the dominant one” in the ﬁght. (TL, p.907, Ls.5-21,

ﬁght [Garcia] back and then

was done.” (TL, p.1324,
hitting

.

He

it

it

it

looked

like

[Gomez]

looked like [Gomez] was just kind of —

like,

A second woman standing next t0 the ﬁght said, “[Garcia] was

just kept seeing

him punching him, punching him.” (TL, p.1269,

L.12 — p.1270, L.2.)
After Garcia ﬁnished stabbing, he ran toward the entrance. (TL, p.1632, Ls.2-6.)

some

his

bloody knife next

He

ran out of China Blue, and multiple bouncers tackled

ch2

at

to

(TL, p.1632, Ls.1 1-17;

chairs.

9:50-10:00.) Garcia “frantic[ally]” tried t0 get

ﬂ

him 0n

He threw

State’s EX. 49; State’s EX. 50.)

the front steps.

(State’s EX. 65,

away from the bouncers. (TL,

p.773, Ls.16-

20.)

Back

inside

and then collapsed.

China Blue, Gomez leaned 0n some

heart. (TL, p.993, Ls.1 1-22, p.

toward the door.” (TL, p.945, Ls.14-18.)

When he

until

145 1 Ls.2-14.) Rosales “walk[ed]
,

L.4.)

An ofﬁcer put pressure 0n Rosales’s

medical help arrived. (TL, p.505, Ls.1-14, p.518, Ls.2-22; State’s EX. 79A.)

Another ofﬁcer placed Garcia
to

stairs,

got outside, someone pointed t0 his stomach

and told him he was bleeding. (TL, p.945, L.25 — p.946,

wounds

slowly shufﬂed around the

He remained unresponsive for a couple of days and then died

(State’s EX. 95.)

from the stab wound through his

stairs,

in handcuffs. (T12, p.446, Ls. 14-19.) Garcia “didn’t appear

have any injuries” other than a small cut on his arm. (TL, p.450, Ls.7-12.) The police took

Garcia t0 the hospital and then the

[they]

jail

saw Mr. Garcia that morning.”

where they documented

(T12, p.

1

553, L. 1 5

— p. 1 554,

“[t]he injuries

and condition as

L. 1 5.) Garcia

complained about

pain in his index ﬁnger from a prior injury, had a small laceration that was “a
centimeter” on his

L20;

ﬂ

left

forearm, and had

some scuffmarks 0n his arms.

(T12,

He

less than a

p.1553, L.8

— p.1554,

State’s Exs. 144-50.)

In an interview with detectives, Garcia told his version of what happened.

152.)

little

told the detectives “there

was a ﬁght going down” and he was

(State’s EX. 152 at 15.)

He repeatedly denied that he and his

(State’s EX. 152 at 20),

and he said he knew “for a fact”

(State’s EX. 152 at 32).

He

friend

that

(E State’s EX.

“trying t0 break

it

up.”

had fought “some other dudes”

“no one just picked a ﬁght with us”

said that he “wouldn’t even try to ﬁght” because his

“ﬁnger [was]

broken.” (State’s EX. 152 at 24.) Garcia speciﬁcally denied that he saw 0r handled a knife and

claimed that even

if some

“guys came up to [him] to ﬁght,” then “[he] wouldn’t have fought them.”

(State’s EX. 152 at 40-41.)

A

few days

later,

detectives interviewed Garcia again.

detectives told Garcia that witnesses told

(TL, p.1629, Ls.16-18.)

them Garcia had a knife

in

China Blue.

(Tr.,

Ls.7-14.) But Garcia kept denying that he had a knife. (Tr., p.1671, Ls.4-20.) Finally,

detectives told Garcia that

nobody would be

lenient With

him

or cut

him

The

p.1670,

When

the

a break if he could not

even admit he had the knife, Garcia confessed that he had a knife in China Blue. (TL, p.1671,
L.21 — p.1672, L9.)

He told the

detectives that, “before the ﬁght start[ed],” he “pulled [his knife]

out and said, hey, back the fuck up.” (TL, p.1673, Ls.9-16.)

guy one

time. (Tr., p.1668, L.21

Before

trial,

p.92, Ls.10-16.)

EX.

2.)

The

— p.1669,

He

also said that he only stabbed one

L.2.)

Garcia objected to several photos as irrelevant and prejudicial. (4/2/2018

The photos showed Gomez before

district court

the night he

was

killed. (State’s

EX.

1;

Tr.,

State’s

overruled Garcia’s objections as to two of the photos: a photo of Gomez

in a

tuxedo on his wedding day and a photo 0f Gomez with his wife

p.98, L.18

— p.99,

The

state

at

presented

its

(Tr.,

Ls.4-5.)

The

(4/2/2018 Tr.,

p.326, Ls.13-14, p.328, Ls.12-14.)

China Blue When Garcia killed Gomez. (TL, p.353, Ls.8—21.)

— p.335,

race.

case through thirty—ﬁve Witnesses over the course 0f six days. (R.,

Gomez, including biographical information and information about
L. 12

5k

L.2.)

pp.459-515.) Danielle Nylander, Gomez’s wife, testiﬁed.

She was

at a

She told the jury about

his personality.

L.13.) Garcia’s counsel objected multiple times t0 the questioning.

district court

overruled the objections.

t0 explain t0 the jury her recollection

(Lg,

T11,

(TL, p.329,

(Lg,

Tr.,

p.330,

p.330, Ls.6-7.) Nylander went 0n

0f the night Garcia killed Gomez. (TL, p.335, L. 14 — p.364,

L21.)
After the state presented

its

case, Garcia testiﬁed.

(TL, p.1618, L.1

— p.1689,

L.22.)

He

admitted that he had lied to the police multiple times about What happened the night 0f the
stabbings.

Gomez
that

(TL, p.1629, L.14

— p.1630,

twice and Rosales eight times.

L.18, p.1634, Ls.18-19.)

(Tr.,

p.1664, L.19

He

— p.1665,

confessed that he stabbed

L.12.)

But he told the jury

he acted in self—defense. (TL, p.1628, Ls.9-14.)

The jury convicted Garcia of second-degree murder, aggravated
for using a deadly

weapon, and possession of a controlled substance.

court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty—ﬁve years t0

Victims in the amount of $162,285.27. (R., pp.592, 639.)

Garcia timely appealed. (R., pp.595-98.)

life

battery,

an enhancement

(R., pp.572-73.)

and ordered

The

district

restitution to the

ISSUES
Garcia states the issues 0n appeal

Did

I.

as:

the district court abuse

Daviel Ruiz

Gomez and

its

discretion

by admitting two photographs of

allowing his Wife, Danielle Nylander, t0 testify

about her opinion of Mr. Ruiz Gomez’ personality and character?

Did

II.

the State Violate Mr. [Garcia]’s right t0 a fair trial

by committing

prosecutorial misconduct?

D0

III.

the errors in Mr. [Garcia’s] case

amount

to cumulative error?

Did the district court abuse it discretion When it imposed, upon Mr. Garcia,
a uniﬁed sentence of life, with twenty-ﬁve years ﬁxed, for his conviction

IV.

for second degree murder, twenty years, with six years ﬁxed, for his

aggravated battery conviction, and three years ﬁxed, for his possession 0f a
controlled substance conviction?

Did

the district court abuse[]

its

discretion

When

it

ordered Mr. Garcia t0

pay $162,185.27 in restitution?
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Garcia

failed t0

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by admitting two

“in life” photos of Gomez?

II.

Has Garcia
Nylander

III.

failed t0

show

to testify about

the district court committed reversible error

by allowing

Gomez?

Has Garcia failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing
argument?

IV.

VI.

Has Garcia

failed to

show cumulative

Has Garcia

failed t0

show

Has Garcia
restitution?

failed to

error?

that the district court

show

abused

that the district court

its

sentencing discretion?

abused

its

discretion in ordering

ARGUMENT
I.

The
A.

District

Court Properly Admitted The “In Life” Photographs

Introduction

The

district court

properly admitted two “in life” photographs 0f Gomez. This Court has

not addressed the admissibility of “in life” photographs 0f murder Victims, but “[t]he majority 0f
appellate courts in other jurisdictions that have considered [the issue] have

admission.”

State V. Broberg,

677 A.2d 602, 607 (Md. 1996). The “in

relevant because the jury could use the photographs to identify

footage,

Which was a key piece 0f evidence

at trial,

and

Gomez

life”

.

.

.

upheld their

photographs were

in the low-quality security

t0 determine that

Gomez was

a human, an

element 0f second-degree murder.

And

the danger of unfair prejudice from the photographs did not substantially outweigh

their probative value.

The photographs, Which were

the only evidence showing

Gomez’s

other than the low-quality security footage, were not unfairly prejudicial t0 Garcia.

photograph showed

Gomez

in a tuxedo

and the other photograph showed

One

Gomez and Nylander in

a park. The photographs were not gruesome, like autopsy 0r other photographs typically
t0 jurors in

face

shown

murder cases, and other than Gomez’s appearance, the photographs only conveyed that

Gomez and Nylander had a relationship, which Nylander had already described to the jury without
obj ection.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“[T]he relevance of evidence

is

subject to free review.” State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 779,

419 P.3d 1042, 1077 (2018). “[T]he lower court’s determination 0f Whether the probative value
0fthe evidence outweighs
quotations omitted).

its

prejudicial effect

is

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”

Li. (internal

The “In Life” Photographs Were Relevant And More Probative Than Unfairlv Preiudicial

C.

The
stabbings.

district court

properly admitted two photographs of Gomez that were taken before the

The photographs were relevant

Gomez’s

t0

identity,

and the danger 0f unfair prejudice

Even

did not substantially outweigh the probative value 0f the photographs.

erred

by admitting

The

that is

was harmless.

The “In Life” Photographs Were Relevant To Gomez’s

1.

Gomez’s

the photographs, the error

“in life” photographs depicting

identity.

Evidence

is

relevant if

it

Gomez

Identity

Gomez was

while

has “any tendency to

make

alive

the evidence.” I.R.E. 401 (2017).

Relevance

is

were relevant

to

the existence 0f any fact

0f consequence t0 the determination 0f the action more probable 0r

would be without

if the district court

less

probable than

it

not determined strictly by the

ﬂ, gg, State V. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 446, 180 P.3d 476, 485 (2008).

elements 0fthe crime.

“Photographs and pictures relevant t0 describe a person, place 0r thing are admissible for the
purpose 0f explaining and applying the evidence and assisting the jury in understanding the case.”
State V. Kleier,

69 Idaho 278, 286, 206 P.2d 513, 518 (1949);

_, 426 P.3d 1260,
assist the jury in

ﬂ

State V. Alwin, 164 Idaho 160,

1268 (2018) (holding photograph admissible because

understanding [the case]”); State

V. Carter,

439 (1981) (holding photograph admissible because

it

it

“was introduced

t0

103 Idaho 917, 922, 655 P.2d 434,

“aid[ed] in explaining and applying the

evidence and assist[ed] the jury in understanding the case” (internal quotations omitted».

The two
and

“in life” photographs of Gomez

were relevant because they “describe[d]” Gomez

M,

“assist[ed] the jury in understanding the case.”

had

0f the ways the

Gomez was

state

could prove

photographs 0f Gomez.

(Tr., p.98, L.

1

8

at

286, 206 P.2d at 518.

As

prove the unlawful killing 0f a human being, and one

the district court observed, the state

t0

69 Idaho

— p.99,

a

human being was

L.2.)

Moreover, the

to

state

show

the jury “in life”

introduced China Blue’s

security Video

from the night of the stabbings as a key part 0f its case against Garcia.

(ﬂ State’s EX. 65.)

EX. 65.) The Video showed numerous people in China Blue.

photographs of Gomez could

“assist[] the jury in

use the photographs t0 help identify

M,

deliberations.

Although

this

69 Idaho

at

Gomez

China Blue security Video during

at 5

Court has not yet considered

1

8.

The photographs were thus

this issue, “[t]he

other jurisdictions that have considered the admissibility of ‘in
their admission.”

BLberg, 677 A.2d

of the photographs because “‘[i]n
identity”

life’

V. Joe, 8

Ms. Washburn
identity”);

that

People

discretion

“in life”

607 (collecting

trial

and

relevant.

maj ority 0f appellate courts

life’

photographs have

.

.

.

in

upheld

These courts upheld the admission

cases).

photographs are often relevant to establish the Victim’s

even when the identity of the Victim was not a contested

United States

its

at

The

understanding the case” because the jury could

in the

286, 206 P.2d

(E State’s

issue.

Li. at 605-10;

ﬂ, gg,

F.3d 1488, 1499 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding “photographs of Ms. Joe and

had been taken prior

V. Boyette,

by admitting

to their deaths

.

.

.

[were] probative 0f the Victims’

58 P.3d 391, 418-19 (Cal. 2002) (holding

district court

for identiﬁcation purposes “[p]hotographic evidence

While they were alive”); Living

V. State,

did not abuse

0f murder Victims

796 So.2d 1121, 1143 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (“In the

present case, the photographs of the Victims while they were alive were clearly relevant t0 identity,
regardless 0f the fact that Living stipulated t0 the issue of identity”); Garcia V. State, 477 S.E.2d

1

12,

1

14 (Ga. 1996) (holding “a photograph of a murder Victim While in

life

generally

is

admissible

[for] identiﬁcation”).

Garcia argues that the photographs were not relevant because Gomez’s humanness
easily

proven and was proven, in the case

brief, p.

1

0.)

at

“is

hand, through other relevant evidence.” (Appellant’s

This argument misunderstands the relevancy requirement. Rule 401 merely requires

that the evidence “haV[e]

any tendency

to

make

the existence of any fact that

10

is

0f consequence

.

.

.

more probable 0r

less probable.” I.R.E.

401 (2017). “This deﬁnition does not pertain t0 only

disputed facts” or difﬁcult—to-prove facts. State V. Sanchez, 147 Idaho 521, 526-27, 211 P.3d 130,

135-36

And

App. 2009).

(Ct.

the existence 0f other evidence relevant t0 the

photographs does not render the photographs irrelevant.

790 P.2d 390, 393
already

bound

(Ct.

App. 1990) (“Although

was proven through
to establish identity

were

issue as the

State V. Phillips, 117 Idaho 609, 6 12,

Phillips argues that identiﬁcation

of the Victims

the testimony 0f Phillips’ daughter and the coroner, the state

by

photographs of Gomez showed
“in life” photographs

E

same

the least-prejudicial

Gomez was

a

means

was not

Because the “in

possible.”).

life”

human and aided the jury by identifying Gomez,

the

relevant.

The Probative Value Of The “In Life” Photographs Outweighed The Danger Of

2.

Unfair Prejudice

As
0f Gomez.

a preliminary matter, Garcia waived his Rule 403 objection to the “in life” photographs

“A party waives an issue

just ifboth are lacking.”

Murray V.

cited

State,

on appeal

if either authority or

argument

is

lacking, not

156 Idaho 159, 168, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014). Garcia

argues in his opening briefthat Rule 403 precluded the admission of some ofNylander’s testimony,
including that

Gomez “was an

‘amazing person’, ‘Very kind’, helpful, close t0 his family, happy,

ﬁtness minded, and community minded.”

argument as

t0

how

(Appellant’s brief, pp.1 1-12.)

(E Appellant’s

photographs a single time in that section 0f his

its

discretion

asserts

n0

the danger of unfair prejudice from the “in life” photographs substantially

outweighed their probative value.

abused

But Garcia

by admitting

brief, pp.1 1-12.) In fact,

brief:

State’s Exhibits

1

he only mentions the

“Mr. Garcia asserts that the

and 2.” (Appellant’s

district court

brief, p. 12.)

That

is

not

sufﬁcient “argument” t0 preserve Garcia’s Rule 403 objection to the “in life” photographs.

Murray, 156 Idaho

at 168,

321 P.3d

at 718.
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In any event, Rule 403 did not preclude the admission 0f

“Although relevant, evidence

by

may be

the danger 0f unfair prejudice

I.A.1., the “in life”

photographs showed

.

.

.

photographs 0f

Gomez’s

“in life” photographs.

excluded

if its

.”

403 (2017). As explained above,

I.R.E.

Gomez had

Gomez was human and

probative value

at least

substantially

is

outweighed

ﬂ s_uw

Part

some probative value because

the

assisted the jury in identifying

Gomez

in the

China

Blue security Video. Notably, these two photographs were the only evidence showing Gomez’s

The medical examiner

face other than the low-quality security Video from China Blue.

photographs, for example, showed only Gomez’s injuries and did not reveal his face.

(ﬂ State’s

Exs.138-43.)

The

“in life” photographs showing

Gomez

in a tuxedo

and

next t0 each other in a park were not unfairly prejudicial.

Gomez and

his wife standing

This Court has long held that

photographs of murder Victims, even graphic photographs showing the injuries that caused death,
are not necessarily unfairly prejudicial: “it should be

presumed

that a person capable

0f serving as

a juror in a murder case can, Without losing his head, bear the sight of a photograph showing the

body 0f the decedent

in the condition 0r place in

278, 506 P.2d 1340, 1351 (1973).

If,

Which found.”

State V. Beason, 95 Idaho 267,

as this Court held in Beason, a juror can, “without losing his

head, bear the sight of a photograph showing” a two-year-old murder Victim’s “head, after the

scalp

had been peeled back, and show[ing] the underside 0f the scalp

discoloration and the skull

which

also

shows discoloration,” surely

losing his head,”

View photographs of a Victim standing alone

wife in the park.

m,

95 Idaho

at

that

itself

same juror

in a tuxedo

277-78, 506 P.2d at 1350-51;

ﬂ

With considerable
can, “without

and standing next

BLberg, 677 A.2d

t0 his

at

561

(holding “in life” photographs were “not unfairly prejudicial” because “neither of the photographs

was more

prejudicial than autopsy photographs that are routinely admitted in homicide cases”

12

(emphasis in original)). Because the “in

pose a danger of unfair prejudice, the

Any Error

3.

Even
the error

was harmless. “To

photographs had some probative value and did not

district court

In Admitting

if the district court erred

life”

properly admitted the photographs.

The “In Life” Photographs Was Harmless

by admitting

either

one or both of the “in

establish harmless error, the State

life”

photographs,

must ‘prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State
157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814 (2014). “‘In other words, the error

ﬁnds
46,

that the result

would be

408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017). Any

the photographs lacked

Garcia’s

same Without the

error.’”

State V.

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40,

error in admitting the “in life” photographs

any prejudicial

harmless ifthe Court

was harmless because

and the jury heard overwhelming evidence 0f

effect

guilt.

The

“in life” photographs could not have contributed t0 the verdict “due to [their] lack of

prejudicial effect.”

V.

the

is

Sanchez

V.

Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 623, 733 P.3d 1234, 1248 (1986);

ﬂm

Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27, 205 P.3d 671, 676 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding erroneous admission of

evidence harmless because

it

“had n0 prejudicial content”). “Generally, photographs taken during

the life of a Victim are not so prejudicial as t0 warrant a

641, 658 (Tenn. 2013);

use of

‘in life’

ﬂ

BLlycrg, 677 A.2d

at

new

trial.”

State V.

(“We

trial.”);

People

admission of “two
“[t]he photographs

V. Taylor,

[‘in life’

m

608 (“[E]Ven Where courts have disapproved the

are not persuaded

by defendant’s argument

one photograph of the Victims while they were alive so prejudiced defendant

new

Adams, 405 S.W.3d

photographs, errors in admission have seldom been found prejudicial.”);

G0_ode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 646 (N.C. 1995)

a

V. Parker,

that

he

is

that

entitled t0

801 P.2d 1142, 1146 (Cal. 1990) (ﬁnding any error in the

photographs] that depicted children with the Victim” harmless because

were innocuous”).
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Neither “in life” photograph of

showed Gomez

Gomez

in formal attire standing alone

Exhibit 2 showed

Gomez

contained prejudicial content.

and smiling

State’s Exhibit

camera. (State’s EX.

at the

With his arm around Nylander in the park.

1.)

(State’s EX. 2.)

1

State’s

The only

information conveyed by the photographs themselves was Gomez’s appearance, which the jury

saw in the China Blue

security Videos Without obj ection

(E State’s EX. 65; Tr., p.736,

from Garcia

L.23 — p.737, L.8), and the existence 0f a relationship between

Nylander described

The

Gomez and

Nylander, Which

to the jury without objection (TL, p.328, Ls.12-14).

“in life” photographs

evidence 0f Garcia’s

m

guilt.

were also harmless because the

Montgomegy, 163 Idaho

at 46,

state

presented overwhelming

408 P.3d

Garcia took the

at 44.

stand and confessed that he possessed methamphetamine, he stabbed Rosales eight times, and he

stabbed

Gomez twice.

(T12,

p.1639, Ls.6-12, p.1664, L.19

testiﬁed that Garcia stabbing

and Garcia did not dispute

Gomez

— p.1665,

in the heart caused

L. 12.)

The medical examiner

Gomez’s death (TL, p.1451,

Ls.2-14),

that conclusion (TL, p. 1637, Ls. 14-16).

Given Garcia’s concessions, the only issues

for the jury to decide

were Whether Garcia

acted With malice and Whether Garcia reasonably acted in self—defense. (R., pp.543-45, 549-555,

558-61.)

Malice requires only that “[t]he killing resulted from an intentional

consequences 0fthe act are dangerous t0 human

knowledge 0f the danger

t0,

and

[t]he act

and With conscious disregard

removed).)

And

are limited

by what a reasonable person

“[t]he kind

life,

for,

same

deliberately performed with

human

and degree of force which a person
in the

was

act, [t]he natural

life.”

(R.,

p.544 (numbers

may lawfully use

in self—defense

situation as such person, seeing

person sees and knowing What that person knows, then would believe t0 be necessary.”

what

that

(R., p.559.)

Garcia’s behavior leading up to the stabbings and the Viciousness 0f the stabbings constitute

overwhelming evidence

that Garcia acted with malice

14

and not

in self—defense.

Start

“[W]i1d” and “stupid”

18, p.

1

Garcia’s acquaintances testiﬁed that he had been acting

with Garcia’s behavior.

3 14, L. 1 8

all

night and that Garcia said “he

— p. 1 3 1 5,

p.1061, L.14

— p.1062,

two

strangers like he

was

(Tr.,

p.552, Ls. 14-

from Hannah’s testiﬁed

L.2.) Consistent with that testimony, a bouncer

that Garcia “instigat[ed]” a confrontation with

(T12,

was looking for a ﬁght.”

“trying to get into a ﬁght.”

L.13.) After that confrontation, and again according t0

members 0f

Garcia’s group, Garcia pulled out his knife and “bragged about wanting t0 d0 shit” to the two

strangers. (TL, p.554,

As
in

L.10 — p.555, L.7, p.583, Ls.8-24.)

seen in the Videos played t0 the jury, Garcia again had his knife out shortly thereafter

China Blue

after

elbow checking a

3:25-3:49; State’s EX. 69.)

walked

into the

Garcia

still

had

ﬂ

State’s EX. 65,

Garcia also had his knife out and ﬂipped the blade open

bathroom just before having

at 11:00-1 1:22; State’s

(TL, p.1643, Ls.3-7;

stranger.

And just

EX. 77.)

ch06

at

When he

his confrontation With Rosales. (State’s EX. 65, ch11

sixteen seconds before the stabbings, the Video

his knife out. (State’s EX. 88.) Garcia telling his cohorts that “he

showed

was looking

for

a ﬁght,” repeatedly confronting strangers, and pulling out his knife in close temporal proximity t0
those confrontational situations

is

the antithesis of self—defense.

The Viciousness of Garcia’s

attack also

showed

that

he acted with malice and not in a

reasonable manner t0 defend himself, especially given What Garcia

know” Whether Rosales had

stabbings. Garcia admitted that he “didn’t

Rosales,

Gomez,

or Misael with a knife.

China Blue had security who could help

(Tr.,

p.1679, L.12

if necessary,

“should have gone and talked to the bouncers.”
decided to stab Rosales and

Gomez

Ls. 12-17.) Garcia’s Willingness

— p.1680,

knew
a

at the

weapon and did not

L.21.)

and even admitted

(TL, p.1685, Ls.1-4.)

He

t0

also

knew

see

that

t0 detectives that

he

Nevertheless, Garcia

ten times in approximately eleven seconds.

and desire

time of the

(TL, p.1678,

ﬁght demonstrated by his behavior over the course

15

0f the night and the Viciousness 0f his attack against two people

armed

believe were

constitutes

overwhelming evidence

whom

Garcia had no reason t0

that Garcia acted With malice

and not

in

self—defense.

That leaves Garcia only his

own testimony to

0f force. But his testimony had serious
First,

that

on

his malice or unnecessary use

issues.

Garcia admitted that he had already told police two different versions ofthe stabbings

were both lies.

him to

cast doubt

(Tr., p.

1

634, Ls. 1 5-19.) Before Garcia knew the police had any way to connect

his knife, Garcia told the police: “I didn’t

a knife.” (State’s EX. 152 at 49.)

Once

have a

knife.

I

didn’t see a knife.

the police informed Garcia that they

I

didn’t touch

had Witnesses Who

saw him with

the knife and offered potential leniency for his crime, Garcia changed his story and

claimed

“before the ﬁght start[ed],” he “pulled [his knife] out and said, hey, back the fuck

that,

up.” (TL, p.1673, Ls.9-25.)

When Garcia took the

stand at

trial,

and

after hearing the state’s case

seeing the Video evidence, he changed his story yet again and testiﬁed that he did not pull out his
knife until after the ﬁght started. (TL, p.1665, Ls.20-24.)

Second, eye-Witness testimony and photographic evidence contradicted Garcia’s version

0f the ﬁght.

Garcia testiﬁed that he had no choice but to pull out his knife and

because he “was being
p.1665, L.25

hit in the

dominant one” and the “aggressor” in the ﬁght.

attack.

ﬁrst

women

(TL, p.1269, L.12

went

to

(T12,

p.910, L.22

—

p.91

1,

L.5.)

L.2, p.1324, Ls.3-10.)

.

.

.

the

And, consistent

standing next t0 the ﬁght both testiﬁed that Garcia

— p.1270,

(T12,

break up the ﬁght, on the other hand,

or anything” but instead “was deﬁnitely

was not “being overpowered

with that testimony, two

stabbing

head” and was “getting kneed, kicked, [and] punched.”

— p.1666, L23.) The bouncer Who

testiﬁed that Garcia

start

was 0n

the

Furthermore, despite Garcia’s

testimony that he “was getting kneed, kicked, [and] punched” in the head (Tn, p.1666, Ls.1 1-23),

16

the photographs of Garcia taken shortly after the ﬁght

injuries

on

his

body other than some scuff marks 0n

Which presumably came from

his

own

show n0

his

injuries

0n Garcia’s head and no

arms and a small laceration 0n one arm,

knife since no one else

was armed.

(State’s Exs. 41, 144-

50.)

Third, and

most problematic

even accepting Garcia’s testimony as

for Garcia,

true,

did not use reasonable force in defending himself. Although Garcia told the police he
his Victims holding a knife, Garcia admitted at trial that

were armed.
and

(T12,

p.1679, L.12

Gomez knocked him

L.9 — p.1632, L.1.)

heart,

— p.1680, L21.)

t0 the ﬂoor,

he had lied and he did not

Nevertheless, according to Garcia,

Garcia

saw one of

know

if

they

When Rosales

he pulled out his knife and started stabbing. (TL, p.1631,

Garcia confessed that he stabbed

and stabbed Rosales eight times.

(T12,

Gomez

p.1664, L.19

twice, including once through the

— p.1665,

L.12.)

This alone shows

Garcia did not defend himself using reasonable force because Garcia introduced a knife into a bar

ﬁght and thus “escalated the ﬁght

t0

one of potentially

lethal proportions.”

State V. Hernandez,

133 Idaho 576, 586, 990 P.2d 742, 752 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding evidentiary error harmless in

self-

defense case because defendant “introduced the use 0f a knife into a fracas Which, up to that point,

involved only two young

men

struggling for control 0f a T-ball or baseball bat”).

Put simply,

Garcia’s testimony does not cast doubt on his guilt because n0 reasonable person engaged in a bar

ﬁght would ﬁnd

it

necessary t0 pull out a knife and stab unarmed opponents ten times in less than

eleven seconds. Thus, if the district court erred by admitting the “in life” photographs, any such
error

was harmless.
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II.

Allowing Nvlander To Testify About
A.

Error

Introduction

The

district court

Gomez. The

state

did not

commit reversible

concedes that the

Gomez were

harmless and thus does not require a

new trial.

The

0f Nylander’s answers ﬁt into

rest

information.

First, as

many

ability

Gomez’s

make

trait for

it

testify

about

should have sustained Garcia’s objection t0

trying t0 have children.

at least

But

that error

was

one 0f three categories of relevant

Gomez’s background

humanized the Victim of the murder and gave the jury helpﬁll

sense 0f the crime.

were relevant

when it allowed Nylander t0

courts outside of Idaho have recognized,

information was relevant because
information to

error

district court

Nylander’s testimony that she and

and

Gomez Was Not Reversible

Second, evidence concerning Gomez’s physical stature

to the ﬁght, including Garcia’s claim

peacefulness and other similar

traits

was

0f self—defense. Third, evidence of

relevant t0 Whether

Gomez

started the

ﬁght.

Standard

B.

Of Review

“[T]he relevance 0f evidence

is

subject t0 free review.” State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 774,

419 P.3d 1042, 1072 (2018).

C.

One Of Nvlander’s Answers About Gomez Were Admissible, And The
Allowing The Inadmissible Answer Was Harmless
A11 But

The

district court

did not commit reversible error

about Gomez. A11 of Nylander’s answers about
she and

Gomez were trying t0 have

in the district court.

The

children,

Gomez were

and Garcia

district court’s error in

When

it

Error In

admitted Nylander’s testimony

relevant except her testimony that

failed to preserve his

Rule 403 argument

admitting Nylander’s single inadmissible answer

was harmless.
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A11 But

1.

One Of Nvlander’s Answers About Gomez Were Relevant

Gomez were

A11 of Nylander’s answers about

relevant if

it

make

has “any tendency to

relevant With one exception.

the existence 0f any fact that

determination of the action more probable or less probable than
I.R.E.

categories: (1)

would be without the evidence.”

Gomez were

Gomez’s

character

First,

to the prosecutor’s questions all ﬁt into at least

background information about Gomez,
trait for

(2),

peaceﬁllness 0r a similar

Gomez’s physical

trait.

trying t0

one of three

stature 0r ability, 0r

Each category was

relevant.

Nylander’s testimony about Gomez’s background was relevant.

appellate courts have not addressed the relevance 0f a

is

of consequence t0 the

is

401 (2017). With the exception of Nylander’s answer that she and

have children, Nylander’s answers

(3)

it

Evidence

While Idaho’s

murder Victim’s background information,

courts outside of Idaho have held that “[t]he identity and general background of the Victim are

relevant issues in a

V.

murder

Roper V.

trial.”

State,

375 S.E.2d 600, 605 (Ga. 1989);

Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 228, 233 (Ky. 2017) (“[A]

regarding the Victim

is

certain

amount ofbackground evidence

relevant to understanding the nature of the crime.”);

Santiago, 681 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 (Mass. 1997) (“Certainly the prosecutor

something 0f the person whose

M,

life

had been

lost in order t0

is

Commonwealth

V.

entitled to tell the jury

humanize the proceedings.”);

m

859 P.2d 1050, 1057 (Nev. 1993) (“[F]acts establishing a Victim’s identity and general

background

.

.

.

are admissible.”), vacated

Davenport, No. A-94-009, 1994

WL

0n other grounds, 516 U.S. 1037, 1037 (1996);

642698,

at

For example, in
argued that the

McQueen

district court erred

V.

.

.

.

Commonwealth, 669 S.W.2d 519 (Ky.

when

murder Victim “was 22 years 0f age

it

State V.

*8 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (“Some limited and

discreet personiﬁcation 0f the Victim does serve an appropriate purpose

the

ﬂ Richmond

.”)

(unpublished).

1984), the defendant

admitted testimony from a murder Victim’s father that

at the

time 0f death, had graduated from Eastern Kentucky

19

State University,

was working

to secure funds to

complete her Master’s Degree

at

Morehead

State

University and that she died 0n January 17, 1980.” Li. at 523. The Supreme Court of Kentucky
disagreed: “It would, 0f course,

we ﬁnd no

behoove the appellant

t0

be

tried for the

error in bringing t0 the attention of the jury that the Victim

than just a nameless void

left

murder of a

was

statistic,

a living person,

somewhere 0n the face of the community.” Li;

ﬂ

Goffv.

but

more

State, 14

So.3d 625, 652 (Miss. 2009) (holding testimony admissible Where Witness “identiﬁed himself as

husband of eight years,

[the Victim]’s

Where

[the Victim]

worked as well

as

reiterated that they

had two children together, and

stated

what kind ofwork she did” because “the testimony concerned

the background of the Victim and merely set the stage for the presentation of relevant evidence”)

(internal quotations, brackets,

and

941 S.W.2d 922, 931 (Tex.

ellipses omitted); Matchett V. State,

Widow

Crim. App. 1996) (afﬁrming admission 0f testimony from Victim’s

that she

married to the Victim for twenty—ﬁve years, they had ﬁve children, and the Victim was

on the night of his murder and identiﬁcation of her husband

Even

the

Supreme Court 0f the United

information Will often

(1

991) (“In

because of

come

many cases the
its

into evidence at

in a

E

Payne

evidence relating to the Victim

relevance at the guilt phase 0f the

is

trial.”);

V.

child,

on an errand

t0 his church”);

ﬂ

also

Galloway

so

.

.

.

guilt

friends).

background

already before the jury at least in part

Page, 501 U.S.
was a

V. State,

2013) (“Thus, Payne suggests that limited Victim-background evidence

may have t0 be admitted—during the

alone

Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 823

concurring) (“The jury will not be kept from knowing that the Victim

and

home

photograph 0f him with

States has recognized that Victim

trial.

had been

at

840 (Souter,

J.,

minister, With a Wife

122 So.3d 614, 671 (Miss.

may be admitted—indeed,

phase 0f trial.”). As Justice Souter explained,

“[t]his is

because the usual standards of trial relevance afford factﬁnders enough information about

20

the surrounding circumstances to let

m,

itself.”

Many

501 U.S.

them make sense 0f the narrowly material

840 (Souter,

at

J.,

facts

0f the crime

concurring).

0f these same courts, however, have drawn a line

“Although background evidence regarding the Victim

is

at

Victim impact evidence.

relevant to understanding the nature of the

crime, Victim impact evidence differs from Victim background evidence, in that the former

is

generally intended t0 arouse sympathy for the families 0f the Victims, Which, although relevant to
the issue ofpenalty,

at

233

is

largely irrelevant t0 the issue of guilt or innocence.”

(internal quotes

and brackets omitted);

24 (Ky. 2015) (discussing

“[t]he line

impact testimony”); Renteria

V. State,

ﬂ Roe

V.

Richmond, 534 S.W.3d

Commonwealth, 493 S.W.3d 814, 823-

between relevant-background information and prejudicial-

206 S.W.3d 689, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Allowing the admission ofvictim background information, but not Victim impact evidence,
comports With

this Court’s

“[e]Vidence

relevant if

is

consequence

it

broad interpretation of relevance.
has ‘any tendency t0

t0 the determination

make

Under

the existence of

by

any

fact that is

of the action more probable 0r less probable.’” State

148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010) (quoting I.R.E. 401).
limited

this Court’s precedent,

the elements of the crime.

E,

1g” Yakovac,

145 Idaho

Relevance
at

is

V.

0f

Johnson,

not strictly

446, 180 P.3d at 485

(holding warrants were admissible even though they “were not relevant to the possession of

methamphetamine charge
also depends

Whether

it

ﬂ

itself”

because they “explain the police ofﬁcers’ actions”). Relevance

on the evidence’s “relationship

to the legal theories presented

“help[s] the jury understand” the facts before

Yakovac, 145 Idaho

at

925;

is

thus relevant because

866 (Ky. 2000),

ﬂ

LC.

it

§

at

446, 180 P.3d at 485.

it.

Johﬂ,

is

148 Idaho

V.

at

671, 227 P.3d

Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858,

the unlawful killing of a

21

the parties” and

A murder Victim’s general background

“humanize[s] the Victim[],” Graves

18-4001 (“Murder

by

human being

.

.

.

.”),

and

“aff0rd[s] factﬁnders

enough information about the surrounding circumstances

sense 0f the narrowly material facts 0f the crime
concurring).

501 U.S.

at

them make

840 (Souter,

the

court properly admitted Nylander’s

trial

background. For example, Nylander testiﬁed that

he was an

HVAC

Gomez

testimony describing Gomez’s

“did welding for a While and then after

technician,” that he attended high school at Skyview, that he lived in an

apartment in Meridian, and that he had one

sister

and two brothers.

(TL, p.329, L.12

L.13.) A11 0f this testimony “can be described as ‘general background’ information” and

relevant.

m,

The

375 S.E.2d

however, when

it

crossed the line into Victim impact evidence because

was harmless.

district court

ﬂm

it

(Tr.,

of

1,

Ls.1 1-18.) That testimony

how Gomez’s

the jury

death

Part II.C.3.

0f self—defense.

*5 (Idaho Ct. App. June 29, 2016) (“The

[the Victim’s] physical abilities

was

E

abilities

was

State V. Malec,

district court

relevant to the ﬁght

No. 42508, 2016

WL

properly concluded evidence

relevant to [the defendant’s] claim 0f self—defense.”). For

example, Nylander testiﬁed that she and

2

was thus

should have sustained Garcia’s relevancy objection, but the

that occurred, including Garcia’s claim

at

p.33

showed

Second, Nylander’s testimony about Gomez’s physical

3620715,

p.335,

overruled Garcia’s objection to Nylander’s

Gomez were trying to have children.

impacted his wife. The

—

at 605.

district court erred,

testimony that she and

error

J.,

2

Here,

that

m,

itself,”

to let

Gomez were

“both very ﬁtness—driven people,” that they

Garcia makes a baseless claim that ﬁnding Victim background information relevant will result in

of [the] Victim in determining Whether 0r not a murder
The admission of Victim background information is, of
course, subject t0 Rule 403’s balancing.
1g” State V. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1203 (NJ.
1988). Here, however, Garcia waived that obj ection by failing to assert it in the district court.

juries “consider[ing] the value or quality

occurred.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

E,

m

E

Part II.C.2.
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“would go on hikes together,”
that

that they

Gomez “was pretty active,

“would g0

t0 the

gym

together pretty consistently,” and

so physically ﬁt.” (Tr., p.334, L.8

— p.335,

L.1

1.)

This testimony

helped the jury evaluate the ﬁght that occurred, including evaluating Garcia’s claim 0f

self-

defense.

Gomez’s

Third, Nylander’s testimony about

was

relevant to Whether

P.3d 31, 36 (2017)

Gomez was the initial

trait for

aggressor.

peaceﬁllness and other similar

E

Marr V.

State,

traits

163 Idaho 33, 38, 408

(“‘Here, Jones’s character trait for belligerence is relevant

because

it

is

synonymous With hostility and combativeness, and Marr claims that Jones was the initial aggressor
and

that

he acted in self—defense When he restrained J0nes.”). For example, Nylander testiﬁed that

Gomez “was

a very kind person”

was “a happy person.”
relevant because

(T12,

who was

“willing to help people at

—

p.329, L.19

Gomez’s kind and happy

p.330,

all

times” and that

Gomez

L3, p.333, Ls.10-13.) This testimony was

personality

made

it

less likely that

Gomez

initiated a

ﬁght with a stranger.

The Idaho Rules of Evidence support

this conclusion.

In a homicide case such as this, the

Idaho Rules 0f Evidence expressly permit the prosecutor to offer evidence 0f the alleged Victim’s
trait for

this

peacefulness.

E

I.R.E. 404(a)(2) (2017).

While the

rule allows the prosecutor to offer

evidence only “t0 rebut evidence that the Victim was the ﬁrst aggressor,” I.R.E. 404(a)(2)

(2017) (emphasis added), Garcia did not obj ect to the timing of Nylander’s testimony at

m

Part II.C.2.

in his

trial,

ﬂ

And Garcia argued that Gomez and his friends were the ﬁrst aggressors—starting

opening statement

of the Witnesses (gg,

(T12,

Tr.,

p.321, Ls.3-13, p.324, Ls. 14-23), continuing through his questioning

p.1001, Ls.20-23, p.1048, Ls.10-12), and ﬁnishing in his closing

argument (TL, p.1775, Ls.4-10).

The

fact that the rules

prosecutor t0 admit evidence 0f the Victim’s

trait for

23

0f evidence expressly permit the

peaceﬁllness in a case where the defendant

claims the Victim was the ﬁrst aggressor means such character evidence must be relevant in those
circumstances.

Garcia challenges Nylander’s testimony that
ever meet in your

life.”

But

(Appellant’s brief, p.9.)

because the word “amazing” carries

little

meaning

Gomez “was

in a

most amazing person you’ll

must be read

that testimony

ﬂ

vacuum.

https://Www.merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/amazing

Online,

the

Amazing, Merriam-Webster

(last

Visited

June

little bit

about [G0mez].”

(Tr.,

27,

2019)

The prosecutor

(deﬁning amazing as “causing astonishment, great wonder, or surprise”).
instructed Nylander t0 “[t]ell us a

in context

p.329, Ls.12-15.)

Nylander

answered that “[h]e was the most amazing person you’ll ever meet in your life.” (TL, p.329, Ls. 1215.)

Garcia’s attorney asked to approach, and the district court held an off-the-record bench

conference.

(T12,

Afterward, as if t0 have Nylander clarify her answer, the

p.329, Ls.16-18.)

“Go

prosecutor repeated her original prompt:

ahead, Ms. Nylander,

[Gomez].” (TL, p.329, Ls.19-20.) Nylander then explained that

somebody that was always
testimony that

had

at least

Willing t0 help people at

Gomez was “amazing”

some tendency

t0

make

it

in that

less

all

tell

us a

Gomez “was

little bit

about

a very kind person,

times.” (TL, p.329, Ls.21-23.) Nylander’s

he “was a very kind person” was relevant because

probable that

Gomez

started a

it

ﬁght With a stranger 0n

the night of the murder.3

2.

Garcia Did Not Preserve His Rule 403 Argument

Garcia waived any Rule 403 objection to Nylander’s testimony in the
failing t0 timely obj ect t0 her testimony

that a proper

0n

that basis.

and timely objection must be made

“It is a

ﬁmdamental

in the trial court before

3

district court

tenet of appellate

an issue

is

by

law

preserved for

To the extent Nylander used or the jury understood “amazing” in the more colloquial sense
meaning “impressive” 0r “exceedingly good,” that too would have at least some tendency to make
it less likely that Gomez would start a ﬁght With a stranger 0n the night 0f the murder.
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appeal.”

State V.

Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660

preserve an evidentiary claim of error, a party must timely obj ect 0r

speciﬁc ground 0f objection,
103(a)(1) (2017).

admitted.

ﬂ

St.

if the

move t0

(Ct.

App. 2005).

strike

and

“state[] the

speciﬁc ground was not apparent from the context.”

A timely objection is

an objection made

Alphonsus Diversiﬁed Care,

Inc. V.

at

To

I.R.E.

0r before the time the evidence

MRI Assocs., LLP,

is

148 Idaho 479, 494, 224

P.3d 1068, 1083 (2009). “An objection 0n one ground Will not preserve a separate and different
basis for excluding the evidence.”

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,
party’s position

appeal.”).

V.

Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho

_, 439 P.3d 1267,

at 885,

119 P.3d

at

660;

ﬂ

m

1271 (2019) (“To be clear, both the issue and the

0n the issue must be raised before the

trial

court for

it

t0

be properly preserved for

For example, a relevancy objection does not preserve a Rule 403 objection.

Rocha, 157 Idaho 246, 251-52, 335 P.3d 586, 591-92

(Ct.

Em

App. 2014).

Garcia did not preserve a Rule 403 objection to Nylander’s testimony because he obj ected

only as to the relevance of her testimony.4

Shortly after Nylander started testifying, Garcia’s

counsel asked to approach the bench, and the district court held an off-the-record bench
conference.

(TL, p.329, Ls.16-18.)

After the bench conference, the prosecutor continued her

questioning before Garcia’s counsel “renew[ed] the objection [he] just made.” (TL, p.330, Ls.4-

5.)

The

district court

p.330, Ls.6-1

1.)

overruled the obj ection, and the prosecutor continued her questioning. (TL,

Shortly thereafter, Garcia’s counsel again renewed his objection and, for the ﬁrst

time on the record, stated the basis for his objection: “Your Honor,
I don

’t

I

see the relevance.” (TL, p.33 1, Ls.16-17 (emphasis added).)

would resume

my obj ection.

A short time later, Garcia’s

4

Garcia also waived any argument related t0 Rule 404 because he failed t0 assert a Rule 404
objection in the district court,
State V. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002),

ﬂ

and has not even attempted t0 assert a Rule 404 argument 0n appeal,
Idaho 857, 866, 292 P.3d 248, 257 (2012).
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ﬂ

Bolognese

V. Forte,

153

counsel objected again and, again, stated the basis as relevance.

(TL, p.334, L22.) At no time

(ﬂ

during the challenged testimony did Garcia’s counsel object on the basis of Rule 403.
generally Tr., p.326, L.9

to

Nylander’s testimony.

T0

E

the extent Garcia

Nylander from the stand
is

— p.335,

clear, Garcia’s

Ro_cha, 157 Idaho at 251-52, 335 P.3d at 591-92.

is

relying

t0 preserve his

misplaced for two reasons:

makes

L.13.) Garcia thus failed to preserve his Rule 403 argument as

0n the discussion held

after the district court

Rule 403 objection (Appellant’s

First, as the

context 0f the conversation

limine

in limine

relates

:

left

out of Garcia’s brief

and expressly afﬁrmed he was

under 401 and 403.” (TL, p.371, Ls.18-23.) And, by deﬁnition, a motion in

only

t0

ﬁxture

E

evidence.

In

https://Www.merriam-Webster.com/dictionary/in%2Olimine
threshold

brief, p.9.), his reliance

counsel was not trying t0 retroactively object t0 Nylander’s testimony.

Instead, Garcia’s counsel referred to potential future evidence

“moving

Limine,

Merriam-Webster

as a preliminary matter”).

stand

was untimely.

when

the

E

Alphonsus, 148 Idaho

at

to strike the testimony, but

have—but did not—try
even as

State V. O’Bryan,

to a

left

the witness

494, 224 P.3d at 1083 (“By failing to object

offered into evidence during the

Garcia’s counsel could

timeliness applies.”

motion

trial,

t0

St.

make

Alphonsus waived any

a “delayed objection”

by

t0 strike “the usual rule governing

96 Idaho 548, 556, 531 P.2d 1193, 1201 (1975).

And

t0 strike a witness’s testimony after the witness has left the Witness stand is untimely. C_f.

O’Bryan, 96 Idaho

5

St.

memorandum was

objection”).

moving

Online,

accessed June 25, 2019) (“on the

(last

Second, any objection Garcia made t0 Nylander’s testimony after Nylander

moving

excused

at

556, 531 P.2d at 1201.5

In any event, the evidence’s probative value,

unfair prejudice,

ﬂ

ﬂ

infra Part H.C.3.
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supra Part II.C.1, outweighed the danger 0f

The Erroneouslv Admitted Testimony Was Harmless

3.

The district court’s
to

error in admitting Nylander’s testimony that she

and Gomez were trying

have children and any other errors in the admission ofNylander’s testimony were harmless.

“error

is

harmless

if the

Montgomery, 163 Idaho

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same without the error.”

at 46,

408 P.3d

at 44.

Nylander’s testimony that she and
the reference

was

ﬂeeting.

An

E

Gomez were trying to have children was harmless.
37 P.3d

State V. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 507,

4

1,

(Ct.

First,

App. 2001)

(holding harmless improper references to defendant’s custody status because “these references

occurred ﬂeetingly 0n a few occasions during the course of a siX-day
eight—day

trial (R.,

trial”).

In the context of an

pp.459-520), the complete question and answer included only eight words: “Q.

Any plans? A. Yes. Iwas — we were trying” (Tr., p.33 1

,

Ls. 14-15).

And the

state

made no mention

of the testimony in closing argument. (TL, p.1733, L.11 — p.1774, L.10, p.1814, L.16 — p.1828,

L25.)
Second, the testimony had no bearing on any contested issue.

ﬂ

State V. Peite, 122 Idaho

809, 822, 839 P.2d 1223, 1236 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding prosecutor’s remark harmless because
“the prosecutor’s remark, even if improperly made, had

the case”).

Garcia confessed that he stabbed

no bearing 0n the only contested issue

Gomez and

Rosales.

(T12,

in

p.1678, Ls.12-17.) The

only issues for the jury to decide were Whether Garcia acted in self—defense and Whether he acted

with malice. The fact that Nylander and
either

0f those

Gomez were

trying to have children

issues.

Third, the state presented overwhelming evidence of Garcia’s guilt.

Idaho

at 46,

had no bearing on

408 P.3d

at 44.

the only contested issues.

As explained

ﬂ

m

Montgomery, 163

above, the state presented overwhelming evidence on

supra Part II.C.3.
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In addition t0 the Victim-impact error being harmless, any other error the district court

made

any of the

in admitting

rest

of Nylander’s testimony was also harmless.

overwhelming evidence presented by the

Any

error

would

Any

state

rendered any error harmless.

at

error in admitting Nylander’s testimony about

There

676.

Gomez, such

as

too, the

s_uma Part II.C.3.

also be harmless for the following reasons:

Gomez’s background was harmless

because the biographical information “had n0 prejudicial content.”

P.3d

E

Here

is

Ludo,

147 Idaho

at 27,

205

simply n0 reasonable possibility that bare biographical information about

Where he went

t0 school, his age,

and

his occupation,

had any

effect

on the jury’s

deliberations over Whether Garcia acted With malice 0r used reasonable force to defend himself.

E

State V. Broughton,

450 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Iowa 1990) (ﬁnding harmless any error in admitting

“rather innocuous biographical information” such as “the

and

[a]

number 0f children and

grandchildren,

description 0f [the Victim] ’s personality and character”).

Any

error in admitting Nylander’s testimony about

Gomez

being physically ﬁt was

E

State V. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 895,

894 P.2d 125, 128 (1995) (holding error harmless because

“[i]f anything, the trial court’s error

harmless because Garcia beneﬁtted from the testimony.

beneﬁtted [the defendant]”). Nylander’s testimony that
“t0 the

gym

.

.

.

pretty consistently,” and

“was pretty

claim 0f self—defense. (TL, p.334, L.16 — p.335, L.1

Gomez was

“very ﬁtness-driven,” went

active, so physically ﬁt” supported Garcia’s

1.)

Any error in admitting Nylander’s testimony about Gomez’s trait for peacefulness was also
harmless.
Victim’s

The

trait

rules of evidence expressly allow the prosecutor t0 offer evidence

0f peacefulness t0 rebut evidence that the Victim was the ﬁrst aggressor.

404(a)(2) (2017).

Nylander

0f the alleged

m

I.R.E.

Thus, under the rule, the only problem with admitting the evidence through

at the start

of the

trial

was

that Garcia

had not yet offered “evidence

28

that the Victim

was

the ﬁrst aggressor.” Li. But, as explained above, Garcia’s strategy

convince the jury that

Gomez and his

friends

from beginning

t0

end was

t0

were the ﬁrst aggressors. (TL, p.32 1 Ls.3-13, p.324,
,

Ls. 14-23, p. 1001, Ls.20-23, p.1048, Ls.10-12, p.1775, Ls.4-10.) So, ifthe evidence

had not come

would have properly presented

the testimony

in through

Nylander

at the start

of the

once Garcia offered evidence that

trial,

the state

Gomez was

the ﬁrst

aggressor—and Garcia made

opening statement that he was going to offer evidence that
p.321, Ls.3-13 (“The ﬁght, that

we

Gomez was

believe the evidence will show,

was

it

clear in his

the ﬁrst aggressor.

started

(TL,

and escalated by

Luis Rosales, Davie] Ruiz [Gomez] and Misael Ruiz and they decided that they had t0 confront

Mr. Garcia
are

on the

.

.

.

.”); Tr.,

line.

p.324, Ls.14-23 (“Luis, Misael, [Gomez]

come from

across the bar.

They

They’re going to confront [Garcia and his friend].”).) The potentially premature

admission of the evidence was thus harmless.

ﬂ

State V. Johnson, 163 Idaho 412, 426-27,

414

P.3d 234, 248-49 (2017) (holding erroneous admission 0f testimony harmless because the same
evidence was properly admitted later in the

P.2d 1227, 1232

(Ct.

trial);

State V. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 1071,

812

App. 1990) (holding erroneous admission of evidence harmless because the

evidence became admissible later in the

trial).

III.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct
A.

Her Closing Argument

Introduction

The prosecutor did not commit misconduct
evidence admitted during the
entitled to discuss fully

V.

In

.

Alwin, 164 Idaho 160,

.

.

trial.

It is

in her closing argument; she simply discussed

well-settled that, in closing argument, “both sides are

the evidence and the inferences that should be

,

426 P.3d 1260, 1269 (2018).
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drawn from

it.”

m

Standard

B.

Of Review

“When there

is

an obj ection

subject t0 a tWO-step review”: Whether there

Hill, 163 Idaho at 806,

419 P.3d

at

review of prosecutorial misconduct claims

at trial, appellate

was misconduct and,

if so,

Whether

it

was harmless.

1104.

The Prosecutor Did Not Commit Misconduct BV Discussing Admitted Evidence
Closing Arggment

C.

The prosecutor could not have committed misconduct
discussing evidence admitted at

inferences that should be

“‘There

trial.

both sides are entitled to discuss

fully,

drawn from

from

it.’”

is

their respective standpoints, the evidence

Lwin, 164 Idaho

0n any factor other than the law

evidence admitted at

evidence.” State

trial,

V. Miller,

at

_, 426 P.3d

as set forth

by

slip 0p. at 8

(Idaho

March

at

when the

may

15,

and the

1269 (quotes and
State attempts

the jury instructions

including reasonable inferences that

N0. 46517,

Her

considerable latitude in closing argument, and

“This Court has said, [p]rosecutorial misconduct occurs

t0 secure a verdict

In

argument simply by

in her closing

‘

ellipsis omitted).

is

and

the

be drawn from that

2019) (brackets in original,

emphases added).
Here, the prosecutor discussed only “the evidence admitted
referenced State’s Exhibit

L24.)

,

and State’s Exhibit 2 one time each.

She also repeated, almost verbatim, testimony

Misael.6

p.97 1

1

(Compare

Tr.,

p.1733, L.23

— p.1735, L6,

at trial.”

Speciﬁcally, she

(TL, p.1733, L.23

that the jury heard

ﬂ

I_d.

— p.1734,

from Nylander and

TL, p.326, L.9 — p.335, L.13

£1 Tr.,

L22 — p.974, L.2.) The only “commentary” the prosecutor added were introductory phrases

such as “[y]0u also heard from his Wife, [Nylander]” and “[y]0u

know that.”

(TL, p.1733,

L23 —

p.1734, L24.) That cannot be misconduct because a prosecutor does not commit misconduct in

6

She did not repeat

that

Nylander and

Gomez were
30

trying t0 have children.

her closing argument by discussing evidence admitted at

ﬂ,

evidence.

m,

gg,

N0. 465 17,

trial

and identifying the source of that

9-10 (holding prosecutor did not commit

slip op. at

misconduct because “[t]he prosecutor’s statement was supported by the evidence”).

Unable

to refute that

most basic proposition, Garcia

prosecutorial misconduct that

ﬁnd n0

asserts a couple

of novel theories of

support in the decisions ofthis—or any—court.

First,

Garcia

claims the prosecutor’s statements “should have been couched in the form of a reminder that the
State

had satisﬁed

brief, pp.16-17.)

its

He

Gomez was

burden of proving that Mr. Ruiz
cites

no

authority,

and the

a

human being.”

(Appellant’s

can ﬁnd none, suggesting that a prosecutor

state

commits misconduct by commenting 0n a piece of evidence admitted at trial Without “remind[ing]”
the jury t0

which element 0f the crime the evidence

pertains.

contradicts this Court’s repeated instruction that “[t]here

argument, and both sides are entitled t0 discuss fully

426 P.3d

.

.

.

is

And

Garcia’s unsupported theory

considerable latitude in closing

the evidence.”

m,

164 Idaho

at

_,

at 1269.

Second, Garcia claims the prosecutor committed misconduct because she discussed
admitted evidence with the intent t0 appeal to the emotion, passion or prejudice 0f the jury.
(Appellant’s brief, p. 1 7.) Here, again, Garcia fails to cite any authority to support his novel theory
that discussing admitted evidence at trial

becomes prosecutorial misconduct

if the

the subj ective intent 0f appealing t0 the emotion, passion, 0r prejudice 0fthe jury.

brief, p.17.)

More

importantly, Garcia points to nothing in the record to

show

“it

(E Appellant’s

the prosecutor

that intent other than the prosecutor” s bare reference t0 already-admitted evidence

counsel’s speculation:

prosecutor has

had

and his appellate

appears that the above statements were offered for the sole purpose 0f

appealing t0 the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury.” (Appellant’s brief, p.17.)
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As noted

In fact, the record contradicts Garcia’s accusation.

referenced the two exhibits one time each.

(T12,

above, the prosecutor only

— p.1734, L24.)

p.1733, L.23

Similarly, she

referred to the testimony at issue only a single time; she did not, for example, repeat Nylander’s

testimony over and over throughout her closing argument.

And the

statements that Garcia claims constitute misconduct

prosecutor’s closing argument.

p.1774, L.1

1.)

is

p.1733, L.23

make up only
L.6,

47 (1974) (“[A] court should not

a small fraction of the

ﬂ

Tr.,

p.1735, L.7

its

—

relevant value, not t0

an ambiguous remark t0

that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, Will

meaning from the plethora 0f less damaging

L.6.)

Donnellv V. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-

lightly infer that a prosecutor intends

most damaging meaning or

The cases Garcia

m

— p.1735,

Nylander’s testimony, the only

t0

that the prosecutor referred t0 the testimony for

appeal t0 the passions or emotions of the jury.

its

Tr.,

(Compare TL, p.1733, L.23 — p.1735,

Given the prosecutor’s limited reference

reasonable inference

have

(E

draw

that

interpretations.”).

cannot appeal to the

cites for the general proposition that prosecutors

emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through inﬂammatory tactics do not support his claim.
(Appellant’s brief, p.17.)

conduct

at issue in

Garcia does not even allege that the prosecutor here engaged in the

those cases. Speciﬁcally, Garcia does not claim that the prosecutor

statements that “conﬂicted with the evidence produced at

758, 769-70, 864 P.2d 596, 607-08 (1993),

evidence before [the jury],” State

V.

made any

7

Garcia also cites State

V.

statements that

by

inviting the jury t0

I_d.

at

fell

“wholly outside the

have an emotional reaction

144 Idaho 82, 87-88, 156 P.3d 583, 588-89

LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982). But,

“assum[ed] Without deciding that the [prosecutor’s] comment
harmless.

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho

Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990), or

“overt[ly]” appealed t0 the emotions 0f the jury

to the evidence, State v. Phillips,

trial,” State V.

made any

844-45, 655 P.2d at 51-52.
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.

.

.

was

App. 2007)?

LaMere, this Court
and found the error

in

error”

(Ct.

The prosecutor simply

referred to admitted evidence.

LaMere, 103 Idaho

844, 655 P.2d at 51 (“[T]he prosecutor

at

That

is

not prosecutorial misconduct.

.

.

E

has the right to discuss the

.

evidence.”).

Even

if the

prosecutor committed misconduct in her closing

the error does not require a

reversal.”

new

trial.

argument—and she did not—

Prosecutorial misconduct “does not automatically require

State V. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 471, 163 P.3d 1175, 1183 (2007).

A court need

not reverse a conviction for prosecutorial misconduct “if the Court can conclude, based upon the

evidence and argument presented during the
absent the error.”

trial,

that the jury

would have reached the same

result

I_d.

Here, any prosecutorial misconduct could not have contributed to the verdict. The jury had
already heard and seen everything the prosecutor said and

argument was

m

Tr.,

strictly

p.326, L.9

based solely 0n the evidence. (Compare

— p.335, L.13

w

overwhelming evidence 0f Garcia’s
at

showed because

Tr.,

p.971,

guilt.

ﬂ

Tr.,

L22 — p.974, L.2.)

s_um

Part I.C.3;

ﬂ

the prosecutor’s

— p.1735,

p.1733, L.23

Moreover, the

state

L.6,

presented

211$ Christiansen, 144 Idaho

471, 163 P.3d at 1183.

IV.

The Cumulative Error Doctrine Has

No Application Here

m

Garcia has failed t0 show the cumulative error doctrine applies. “[A] necessary predicate
t0 the application

0f the [cumulative

PeJrr, 150 Idaho 209, 230,

error] doctrine is a

ﬁnding 0f more than one

error.”

245 P.3d 961, 982 (2008). Thus, the cumulative error doctrine cannot

apply because Garcia has failed t0 show two or more errors.

Even if Garcia had shown two
reversal because the state presented

0r more errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not require

overwhelming evidence of Garcia’s

33

guilt.

E

supra Part I.C.3;

ﬂ

also State V. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct.

errors harmless because “there [was]

App. 2000) (holding multiple

overwhelming evidence 0f Barcella’s

guilt”).

V.
Garcia Has Failed

A.

T0 Show That The

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Garcia asserts the

district court erred

(Appellant’s brief, pp.19-24.)

B.

Court Abused

District

Standard

When

by

failing to properly

The record supports

weigh

his mitigating factors.

the sentence imposed.

Of Review

evaluating Whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d

621, 628 (2016).

C.

The

District

Court Did Not Abuse

The district court did not abuse its
of life With twenty—ﬁve years ﬁxed.

Its

Sentencing Discretion

discretion when

It is

presumed

it

imposed an aggregate uniﬁed sentence

that the

ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence

will

be

the defendant’s probable term of conﬁnement. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387,

391 (2007).

Where

a sentence

demonstrating that

it is

(citations omitted).

To

a clear abuse 0f discretion.

sentence

is

facts.

Li.

differing weights

The

show

at 8,

the sentence

is

368 P.3d

at

628

excessive under

Li.

reasonable if

it

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

retribution.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

carry this burden the appellant must

any reasonable View 0f the

A

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of

is

district court

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

when deciding upon the

sentence.

34

I_d.

at 9,

368 P.3d

at

629; State V. Moore, 131

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the obj ectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the

need for

“In deference t0 the

rehabilitation).

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

not be considered an abuse 0f discretion
Garcia’s sentences were

maximum

all

by the

life

trial

ﬁxed within

sentence for second-degree murder

sentenced Garcia t0

court.”

368 P.3d

I_d.

by

the limits set

is life,

With twenty-ﬁve years ﬁxed

ﬂ

LC.

the applicable statutes.

and the

§ 18-4004,

(R., p.592).

aggravated battery as enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon

§

8,

View 0f

Furthermore, “[a] sentence ﬁxed Within the limits prescribed by the statute Will ordinarily

at 628.

LC.

its

The

district court

The maximum sentenced

is thirty

years,

ﬂ

LC.

§

for

18-908;

19-2520, and the district court sentenced Garcia to twenty years With six years ﬁxed (R.,

p.592).

The maximum sentence

for possession 0f methamphetamine is seven years,

2732(c)(1), and the district court sentenced Garcia to three years

ﬁxed

p.1901, Ls.20-23;

ﬂ

LC.

§ 37-

(R., p.592).

In deciding the sentence t0 impose, the district court considered
factors: “the protection

ﬂ

all

of the appropriate

0f society, rehabilitation, deterrence and punishment or retribution.” (TL,
p.1901, L.10

Tr.,

— p.1908, L25.) The

district court

found that “[s]0ciety

has a right t0 be fearﬁll of [Garcia]” because “Mr. Garcia has demonstrated a capacity for Violence
that is completely out

of proportion t0 any perceived circumstances that he has encountered” and

“a willingness t0 use a deadly
p.1907, L.24

The

— p.1908,

L.1

district court

weapon

in carrying out that Violence with lethal results.”

(TL,

1.)

found rehabilitating Garcia would be a longshot: “Mr. Garcia’s more

likely entrenched in his long-standing anger issues, his resentment

circumstances more than any remorse for his actions.”
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(Tr.,

toward authority and his

p.1904, Ls.5-14.) The district court

also found that deterrence does not

“was on probation
he committed
[Garcia]

attitude

for the offense

this

murder and

work with

Garcia.

(TL, p.1906, Ls.3-24.)

Because Garcia

of aggravated assault through use of a deadly weapon

this

aggravated battery,” the

district court

at the

found “the

time

fact that

would arm himself again, seek out methamphetamine, put himself in a position with
0f repeatedly aggressing patrons of at

least

two 0f these establishments

that

he was

the

at that

evening shows fairly clearly that the threat 0f future incarceration doesn’t deter him from either
substance abuse 0r Violence.”

(Tr.,

p.1906, Ls.3-24.)

And the district court found the need for severe punishment because “[t]he injuries
by Mr. Garcia
court] that

.

.

.

were grave and they were permanent,” and

Mr. Garcia underst[ood] the level 0f trauma

Will suffer for many years t0

come.”

was not an abuse 0f its sentencing

(Tr., p.

factors.

907, Ls.10-23.)

he

.

.

.

appear to [the

district

inﬂicted and that these Victims

The district court’s thorough analysis

discretion.

Garcia erroneously argues that the

weigh mitigating

1

that

“[i]t [did]n’t

caused

district court

(Appellant’s brief, p.20.)

abused

its

discretion

Garcia argues the

by failing

to properly

district court failed t0

adequately consider Garcia’s substance abuse problem. (Appellant’s brief, p.20.) But the evidence

he

cites

shows only that he had a substance abuse problem years prior to the murder, including that

he received a recommendation t0 participate in outpatient treatment more than ﬁve years before
the murder. (Appellant’s brief, p.20.) Garcia’s counsel’s bare assertion at sentencing that Garcia

“has a methamphetamine addiction and alcohol issue” did not require the district court to give

Garcia a shorter sentence.

(Tr.,

p.1886, Ls.15-21);

c_f.

323, 324-25 (1982) (holding district court abused

State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90-91,

its

discretion

by

failing t0

645 P.2d

give proper

consideration to the defendant’s alcohol problem where “[t]he presentence investigation report

placed primary emphasis 0n the defendant’s need for alcoholic counseling”).
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And the district court

considered Garcia’s methamphetamine problem

when

it

pointed out that the justice system’s past

attempts to solve the problem had failed. (T12, p. 1906, Ls.3-24.)

Garcia also argues that the
his history

of mental

district court

did not give adequate consideration 0r weight t0

(Appellant’s brief, p.20).

illness.

The

statute

Garcia relies on only requires

the district court t0 consider the defendant’s mental condition “if the defendant’s mental condition

is

LC.

a signiﬁcant factor.”

19-2523.

§

Garcia’s mental condition

was not a signiﬁcant

factor

because, again, Garcia relies solely on information from more than ﬁve years before the murder.
(Appellant’s brief, p.20);

2010) (ﬁnding mental

illness unrelated to the

made no mention ofmental
and

his sentencing

State V. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288,

C_f.

crime not a signiﬁcant factor

illness at the sentencing hearing

memorandum

233 P.3d 732, 735

(ﬂ Tr., p.

stated only that he “has suffered”

1

at sentencing).

886, L. 1 5

(i.e.,

— p. 1 900,

Even

if the statute

App.

Garcia
L. 1 7),

past tense) “from mental

health concerns that include a suicide attempt” (Sealed R., p.717), Which occurred

years before the murder (PSI, pp.524-25).

(Ct.

more than ﬁve

applied here, Garcia’s failure to

present any evidence as to Garcia’s current mental state precluded the district court from following
the statute’s mandate.

extent to

LC.

which the defendant

In

illness.

m

all

is

§

19-2523(1)(a) (requiring the district court to consider “[t]he

mentally

ill”)

(emphasis added).

events, the district court considered the reports that discuss Garcia’s history of mental

(TL, p. 1 840, Ls.9-10 (“I have reviewed those reports.”).)

from mental

illness

more than ﬁve years before

the

And the fact that Garcia suffered

murder did not require the

district court to

give

Garcia sentences shorter than the sentences imposed.

The

district court also failed,

to the letters

from

his friends

Garcia argues, to adequately consider and give proper weight

and family.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.21-22.)
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But the

district court

stated that

it

it

read

all

of the

letters

and expressed

its

rationale for giving the letters the weight that

did:

In this case Mr. Garcia enjoys the support of multitude of his family and friends.
42 folks took the time to write letters attesting t0 his character and recommending
leniency. As I read through those letters, and I read each one 0fthem, it was unclear
to me Whether — how many 0f those writers have a clear understanding 0f the facts
0f this case, had heard the testimony regarding the brutality and the recklessness
with which the defendant attacked [Rosales] and murdered [Gomez] or the efforts
that Mr. Garcia’s companions went t0 0n that evening t0 divert him from the type
0f Violence that I’m satisﬁed they were aware he was intending.

(TL, p.1902, L.13

weight t0 the

— p.1903,

letters

L. 1 .)

when

it

The

district court

found a disconnect between the

recklessness” of the crime. (TL, p.1902, L.13

Garcia also argues that the
Garcia’s remorse.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.22-24.)

0f the conduct and

about this case.”

— p.1903,

(Tr.,

Why

11.)

The

district court

discretion

letters

Yet the

and the “brutality and the

district court

both acknowledged that

“those statements frankly sound hollow

p.1903, Ls.1 1-17.) The district court said

“ﬁnd

that there is

it

between [Garcia] and

any genuine expression 0f remorse.”

them by

jail,

The

.

in

district court

his family

(Tr.,

and

p.1903, Ls.3-

life

and almost

Which included “expressing

profanities, harassing other inmates, being involved in this

throwing food, holding contraband, [and] manipulating the Telemate system.”
L. 14.)

.

“spent a lot 0f time reviewing

could not reconcile the claimed remorse for “taking another

disrespect t0 staff, calling

.

of the other things that he has said regarding — and that he’s not said

all

taking a second” With Garcia’s behavior While being held in

— p. 1 904,

by not giving more

adequately consider and give weight t0

the nine incident reports in the jail and the communications

friends” but could not

its

L.1.)

district court failed t0

Garcia had expressed remorse and explained
light

did not abuse

did not abuse

its

t0 Garcia’s so-called remorse.
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discretion

(Tr.,

p.1903, L.18

by reﬁlsing t0 give any more weight

VI.

Garcia Has Failed T0

Show The

District

Court Abused

Restitution

A.

Discretion

district court erred

Standard

the restitution imposed.

Of Review

“The decision regarding Whether
district court’s discretion

and

is

to order restitution,

Court Did Not Abuse

The

District

The

district court

restitution t0 the Victims.

and

in

What amount,

guided by consideration 0f the factors

section 19—5304(7).” State V. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602,

did not abuse

its

Its

Discretion

discretion

401 (quoting

249 P.3d 398, 401 (201

by ordering

Idaho Code

1).

When It Ordered Restitution

when it

ordered Garcia to pay $ 1 62, 1 85.27 in

restitution in that

at

602, 249 P.3d at

Garcia does not contest that his crimes resulted in economic loss

amount of $162,185.27, and the

district court thus

did not abuse

its

discretion

amount.

Garcia argues that the
restitution.”

within the

“Idaho’s restitution statute permits a court to order restitution for ‘any

I.C. § 19-5304(2)).

t0 the Victims in the

is

set forth in

crime which results in an economic loss to the Victim.” CLbus, 150 Idaho

district court “failed to

adequately consider his inability t0 pay

(Appellant’s brief, p.25.) But the district court “considered Defendant’s economic

circumstances.” (R., p.636.)

And Garcia’s argument that he

the sole basis that he cannot afford

“The immediate

inability to

it is

contradicted

ﬂ

should not have to pay restitution on

by the plain language of the restitution

pay restitution by a defendant

not order restitution.” I.C. § 19-53040);
(Ct.

Garcia To Pay

by imposing restitution in the amount of $162, 1 85.27.

The record supports

(Appellant’s brief, pp.24-26.)

C.

BV Ordering

Introduction

Garcia asserts the

B.

Its

T0 The Victims

shall not be, in

statute:

and of itself, a reason

State V. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379, 93 P.3d 708,

App. 2004).
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Furthermore, the Idaho Court of Appeals has already rejected Garcia’s argument that his
lengthy term of imprisonment precludes

him from being able t0 pay restitution.

115 Idaho 541, 543, 768 P.2d 804, 806 (Ct. App. 1989).

In

ﬂ

State V. Bybee,

Em, the court recognized “the

quand[a]ry 0f requiring a criminal defendant to pay a debt to his Victim through restitution while

he

is

paying a debt t0 society through incarceration.”

Li.

order ofrestitution because, “in the event [the defendant]

But the court nevertheless afﬁrmed the

the Victims should have ready access to the assets for satisfaction of their losses.” Li;

Tiie, 138 Idaho 878, 880, 71 P.3d 477,

Garcia

may

not have his

479 (2003)

GED (ﬂ

m

able to obtain assets [upon his release],

is

ﬂ

(rejecting similar argument).

Appellant’s brief, p.26), but he has committed to

“further [his] education” while in prison (TL, p.1899, Ls.21-25), and he has successfully found

employment Without
old

when he

is

his

GED

in the past (Sealed R., p.719).

ﬁrst eligible for parole.

ﬁnd employment and

(E R., p.592; PSI, p.1.)

acquire assets at that time,

district court

did not abuse

its

Will be just short 0f ﬁfty years

In the event Garcia

is

able t0

Gomez’s family and Rosales “should have ready

access t0 the assets for satisfaction of their losses.”

Thus, the

He

discretion

m,

When

it

115 Idaho

at 543,

768 P.2d

at 806.

ordered restitution.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

restitution.

DATED this 6th day 0f July, 2019.

Jeff Nye

/s/

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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